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Abstract 
 
In the American criminal justice system the vast majority of criminal convictions occur as the 
result of guilty pleas, often made as a result of plea bargains, rather than jury trials. The 
incentives offered in exchange for guilty pleas mean that both innocent and guilty defendants 
plead guilty. We investigate the role of attorneys in this context, through interviews with 
criminal defense attorneys. We examine defense attorney perspectives on the extent to which 
innocent defendants are (and should be) pleading guilty in the current legal framework and their 
views of their own role in this complex system. We also use a hypothetical case to probe the 
ways in which defense attorneys consider guilt or innocence when providing advice on pleas. 
Results indicate that attorney advice is influenced by guilt or innocence, but also that attorneys 
are limited in the extent to which they can negotiate justice for their clients in a system in which 
uncertainty and large discrepancies between outcomes of guilty pleas and conviction at trial can 
make it a sensible option to plead guilty even when innocent. Results also suggest conflicting 
opinions over the role of the attorney in the plea-bargaining process.  
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Limitations on the Ability to Negotiate Justice: Attorney Perspectives on Guilt, Innocence, and 
Legal Advice in the Current Plea System 
 
In the current American criminal justice system the majority of convictions occur as the 
result of guilty pleas rather than trial – in 2015, 97.1% of federal cases that were resolved were 
resolved via a guilty plea by the defendant (United States Sentencing Commission 2014 
Sourcebook). The high rate of pleas has occurred largely as a result of the practice of plea 
bargaining, where a defendant can agree to plead guilty in exchange for a reduced sentence 
rather than exercise their right to a jury trial (Blume & Helm, 2014; Stuntz, 2006). This practice 
is well-known and often accepted as an efficient way to dispose of cases. For example, in the 
case of Missouri v Frye, Justice Kennedy, speaking for a majority of the court stated that “The 
potential to conserve valuable prosecutorial resources and for defendants to admit their crimes 
and receive more favorable terms at sentencing means that a plea agreement can benefit both 
parties” (Missouri v Frye, 2012). This rationale has been used to justify plea bargaining through 
the idea that a defendant can get a reduced sentence by confessing to something that they have 
done (Garrett, 2016). However, academics and legal commentators have noted that 
characteristics of current plea-bargaining practice mean that it is not just operating in a way that 
allows defendants to get a reduced sentence by confessing to something that they have done, but 
also to encourage or even coerce innocent defendants into pleading guilty (see, for example, 
Blume & Helm, 2014; Caldwell, 2011; Dervan & Edkins, 2013; Helm & Reyna, 2017; Zottoli, 
Daftary-Kapur, Winters, & Hogan, 2016). 
 Commentators disagree on the way that the current systems functions. Some have argued 
that it is not a problem that innocent defendants plead guilty because innocent defendants should 
be able to enjoy the benefits of pleading guilty, including reducing or altogether avoiding 
ABILITY TO NEGOTIATE JUSTICE 
	 4	
custody (Bowers, 2008). Others suggest that prosecutors are encouraging those who are unlikely 
to be convicted at trial to plead guilty by offering highly coercive plea deals (Bushway & 
Redlich, 2012; Zottoli et al., 2016).  In either case, the decision to plead guilty appears to have 
become a tactical decision, rather than a moral decision to admit guilt. In this context, the role of 
the defense attorney is complicated. It will often involve trying to help a client navigate many 
competing considerations, assessments of risk, and assessments of factual guilt or innocence. It is 
not clear whether attorneys should be (and are) advising clients on the decision that they should 
make, based on an assessment of their best interests, or whether the proper role of the attorney is 
just to provide the relevant information to a client and leave them to make the best decision for 
themselves. The added consideration of factual guilt or innocence makes this process even more 
complex. In this paper, we interview criminal defense attorneys about their perspectives on and 
experiences with the plea system. We examine responses to probe the extent to which innocent 
defendants are (and should be) pleading guilty in the current legal framework, the way that 
attorneys view their role in this complex system, and the ways in which defense attorneys 
consider guilt or innocence when providing advice on pleas. 
The Plea Decision 
Defendants offered a plea deal must make a decision as to whether they want to exercise 
their right to trial, or whether they want to plead guilty and receive a certain sentence and charge 
that is less severe than they would receive if convicted at trial. The terms offered as part of a plea 
deal can create extreme pressure to plead guilty – in the most extreme case a guilty plea can be 
the only way to protect against a risk of death (through the imposition of the death penalty) as the 
result of trial (Blume & Helm, 2014). This means that plea decisions are not as simple as guilty 
defendants deciding whether or not to admit guilt, but are a tactical decision based on risks and 
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potential consequences. The primary theory examining plea bargaining as a tactical decision is 
known as “bargaining in the shadow of trial.” According to this theory, parties will forecast the 
expected sentence after trial, discount it by the probability of acquittal, and offer some 
proportional outcome in exchange for a guilty plea (Bibas, 2004). Defendants can then consider 
the options, including potential outcomes at trial, and make a rational decision about which is 
preferable for them. Typically, a risk-neutral defendant is expected to plead guilty if an offered 
sentence is less than or equal to her expected value of going to trial.  
In terms of deciding which option (plea or trial) is preferable to a defendant, empirical 
research has confirmed that risk preferences (Bjerk, 2008), probabilities of conviction (Tor, 
Gazal-Ayal, & Garcia, 2010), and potential sentences (Bordens & Bassett, 1985) influence 
defendant decisions. However, research also suggests that defendants are influenced by whether 
they are guilty or innocent (Helm & Reyna, 2017; Tor at al., 2010), pressure from the prosecutor, 
expediency, and acquiescence (including acquiescing with attorney advice) (Bordens & Bassett, 
1985).  This makes the plea decision a complex one that is influenced by defendant psychology 
and attorney practice, as well as by the options involved (Burke, 2007; Covey, 2007; Helm & 
Reyna, 2017). This also means that guilt or innocence can become a secondary concern in the 
decision-making process for both defendants and attorneys, and that innocent defendants plead 
guilty.   
Pleading Guilty When Innocent 
 There is now extensive evidence to suggest that innocent defendants, as well as guilty 
defendants, plead guilty (see, for e.g., Daftary-Kapur & Zottoli, 2014; Dervan & Edkins, 2013; 
Tor, Gazal-Ayal, & Garcia, 2010; Zottoli et al., 2016). In a study of guilty pleas in youth and 
adults who pleaded guilty to felonies in New York City, Zottoli et al, 2016, found that a sizable 
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portion of both youths and adults who had pled guilty claimed to be completely innocent (27% 
and 19% respectively) or at least not guilty of the crime they were charged with (20% and 41% 
respectively). In another study, Covey (2013) examined guilty plea rates among defendants in a 
case that produced a large number of exonerees. He classified participants in the case as 
innocent, maybe innocent, or guilty, and found that 77% of those classified as innocent pled 
guilty, compared to 88% of those classified as guilty, and 89% of those classified as maybe 
innocent (Covey, 2013). This phenomenon has also been confirmed through real wrongful 
convictions. In 2017, about 18% of exonerations listed in the National Registry of Exonerations 
were categorized as involving a guilty plea (National Registry of Exonerations, 2017).  The true 
number of wrongful convictions from guilty pleas is likely even higher than this since 
exoneration is particularly hard for defendants who have pled guilty (Blume & Helm, 2014).  
 Blume and Helm (2014) identified three specific situations in which innocent defendants 
appear to be pleading guilty – low level offenses where a guilty plea allows release from jail, 
cases where defendants have been wrongfully convicted, prevail on appeal, and are then offered 
a plea bargain that will assure their immediate or imminent release, and cases where defendants 
are threatened with harsh alternative penalties if they do not plead guilty. In some of these 
situations the decision to plead guilty seems justifiable and arguably even the only sensible 
decision. In these situations, there is an added complication for attorneys, who may believe that 
the best representation is provided by advising the client to plead guilty, despite being (or 
claiming to be) innocent. This is a complex balance, since it is not desirable for innocent 
defendants to plead guilty but equally it is not desirable for innocent defendants to risk severe 
punishments if convicted at trial. This balance can be even more complicated where even the 
sentence as a result of plea has serious negative consequences for a defendant – for example 
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where it means they will have a serious criminal conviction for the rest of their lives and remain 
“unexonerated” (Blume & Helm, 2014), or where even a misdemeanor conviction will have 
severe consequences such as loss of employment or deportation. Here, innocent defendants can 
end up suffering very serious adverse consequences to avoid the threat of even worse 
consequences at trial. Especially since the advice of attorneys has been shown to be an important 
predictor of defendant plea decisions (Viljoen, Klaver, & Roesch, 2005), it is important to 
understand how they typically advise in these cases and how defense attorney advice might be 
shaping plea practice. 
The Role of Attorneys in the Plea System 
 As experts on the legal system tasked with advising clients, attorneys have an important 
role in the plea-bargaining process (Alschuler, 1975, Hessick & Saujani, 2002). This is 
particularly true since, as noted above, the advice of attorneys has been shown to be an important 
predictor of defendant plea decisions (Viljoen, Klaver, & Roesch, 2005). However, many 
questions about attorney advice in this area, particularly the way attorneys consider suspected 
guilt or innocence when giving advice, remain un-answered. 
 It is unclear whether attorneys should ever be advising an innocent defendant to plead 
guilty. Ethical rules typically call on attorneys to refuse to offer evidence that they know to be 
false and to take reasonable remedial measures where false testimony is offered. However, this is 
clearly not thought to apply in the case of innocent defendants pleading guilty, especially in the 
context of Alford pleas where defendants can plead guilty while explicitly claiming to be 
innocent. Considering the case of the West Memphis Three, where a plea bargain secured the 
release of the defendants after eighteen years of imprisonment and ensured that none of the 
defendants would be executed, Blume and Helm (2014) conclude that “Almost any criminal 
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defense lawyer, including the authors of this Essay, would have advised them to take it (and 
would have cajoled them to take it if they hesitated).” This suggests that attorneys are limited in 
the extent to which they can really negotiate justice for their clients, and their role becomes 
protecting a client from the most severe potential consequences. Research suggests that some 
defense attorneys may be going too far in this regard, having a bias towards plea bargaining in 
legal cases, persuading clients to enter into plea agreements (Alschuler, 1975; Baldwin & 
McConville, 1977; Blumberg, 1979), and participating in a “meet and plead” system, in which 
defendants sometimes meet their attorney for the first time at a court hearing during which a 
guilty plea is offered, accepted, and entered (Bibas, 2013). This is supported by interviews with 
defendants reporting infrequent contact with attorneys prior to accepting plea deals, and very 
short time periods in which to make their decisions (Zottoli et al., 2016).  
 Attorney obligations in plea cases are being clarified through case law, specifically cases 
on ineffective assistance of counsel. In a recent case, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of an 
immigrant whose lawyer falsely told him that pleading guilty to a drug charge would not lead to 
his deportation (when in fact accepting the plea agreement would certainly lead to deportation) 
(Jae Lee v. United States). In that case, the defendant’s lawyer urged him to plead guilty in 
exchange for a lighter sentence and falsely told him that he would not be subject to deportation 
after doing so. The defendant filed a motion to vacate his conviction after learning that he would 
be subject to deportation as a result of his plea, and this was approved by the Supreme Court. 
There are also examples of ineffective assistance of counsel in cases in which an attorney 
advised a client to go to trial and not plead, such as the well-known cases of Missouri v Frye and 
Lafler v Cooper. In Frye, it was found that defense counsel was ineffective because of failing to 
convey a plea offer to a defendant. In Lafler, it was found that defense counsel was ineffective 
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when incompetent advice caused the defendant to reject a guilty plea and proceed to trial. Justice 
Kennedy delivered the majority opinion which held that the proper test is whether, absent the 
ineffective counsel, a defendant would have accepted an offered plea that was less severe than 
his eventual sentence, and the trial court would have accepted the terms of that plea. These cases 
all provide clear examples of ineffective assistance of counsel (although the Lee case was less 
clear in terms of whether the defendant was prejudiced by the ineffective assistance), however 
they also raise interesting questions about exactly what the responsibilities of attorneys are in the 
context of plea agreements. Is the only responsibility to convey a plea offer and to provide 
accurate information? Does the responsibility extend to providing sound advice based on the best 
interests of a client? And should clients claims of guilt or innocence influence attorney advice? 
A small number of studies have examined attorney plea recommendations. One study, 
using an experimental design, showed that probability of conviction, potential sentences, and 
defendant preference all influenced attorney plea advice (Kramer, Wolbransky, & Heilbrun, 
2007). Another study has shown that attorneys can be influenced by the race of a client when 
giving plea advice – feeling that they could obtain better plea deals with a Caucasian client than 
with a minority client, even when controlling for perceptions of guilt (Edkins, 2011). However, 
the relationship between guilt and innocence, attorney advice, and plea decisions has not 
previously been examined in the literature. In this paper, we utilize attorney interviews to probe 
the extent to which innocent defendants are pleading guilty in the current system, the way that 
attorneys view their role in this complex system, and the ways in which defense attorneys 
consider guilt or innocence when providing advice on pleas.  
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were 189 criminal defense attorneys, recruited via defense attorney listservs 
in New York, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Wyoming, Vermont, Idaho, Iowa, Arizona, and Rhode 
Island (note that some attorneys chose to leave some questions blank and so we did not have our 
full sample of 189 attorneys for all questions so the number of attorneys responding to each 
question is reported). Participants completed the study online and participation took around 10 
minutes. Participants were 57.6% male, and 93% white (the remaining attorneys identified as 
black, Asian, Native America, or of mixed ethnicity). Thirty-three percent of participants 
classified their political views as very liberal, 31% as somewhat liberal, 23% as moderate, 11% 
as somewhat conservative, and 2% as very conservative. Our participants had practiced law for 
13.52 years (SD = 10.26), and represented the prosecution in criminal cases 2.81% of the time 
(SD = 11.01), and the defendant in criminal cases 80.43% of the time (SD = 27.45). Participants 
received monetary compensation for their participation. All participants provided consent to take 
part in the study, and the project was approved by the Cornell Institutional Review Board.  
Participants were first asked whether they had any experience advising clients on whether 
to accept plea bargains and could select an answer of yes, no, or prefer not to answer. They were 
then asked a series of interview questions, and finally completed an experimental task involving 
two hypothetical vignettes.  
Interview Questions 
 Participants were asked to respond to the following questions, in the order that they 
appear below.   
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How often do innocent defendants plead guilty? Participants were asked whether they 
had ever been involved in a case where a client chose to plead guilty despite maintaining their 
innocence (and selected yes, no, or prefer not to answer), and whether they had ever advised a 
client who they believed was innocent to plead guilty (and selected yes, no, or prefer not to 
answer).  They were then asked to provide a rough estimate of what proportion of defendants 
who plead guilty they think are completely innocent, or guilty of a lesser crime than the one they 
end up pleading guilty to (note that this question was added to the survey instrument late and 
therefore only 46 attorneys were asked this question). We asked participants for a written 
response, and told them that they could just write NA if they felt unable to give a figure.  
 When should innocent defendants plead guilty? Next, we asked participants whether 
there were cases in which they believed that innocent defendants should plead guilty and if so, 
what the characteristics of these cases were. 
 The role of attorneys. Participants were then asked questions probing attorney advice to 
clients. First, they were asked whether they have ever encouraged a client who wished to take a 
plea deal to go to trial. Second, they were asked whether they have ever encouraged a client who 
wished to go to trial to take a plea deal.  
Experimental task assessing attorney advice 
Participants were given two hypothetical plea vignettes and were asked to decide whether 
a client should go to trial or plead guilty in the vignettes. One (Case 1) involved a young girl who 
had been caught with marijuana, and the other (Case 2) involved an adult who was accused of 
sexual assault (the specific vignettes presented to attorneys are included in the appendix). In both 
cases, the defendant claims that they are innocent and must choose to plead guilty in exchange 
for a misdemeanor conviction or go to trial and risk getting convicted of a felony. We randomly 
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assigned half of the participants to see additional facts in the hypotheticals which meant that 
pleading guilty (even to a misdemeanor) would have particularly harmful consequences for the 
client - likely rejection of a citizenship application (in the marijuana case) or the loss of a career 
as a teacher (in the sexual assault case). Participants would either see both cases with these 
additional consequences, or neither case with these additional consequences. We included this 
case to mirror scenarios such as that in the Lee case, where even a misdemeanor conviction 
would have severe consequences, to see whether this would discourage attorneys from advising a 
client to plead guilty (especially where they suspected they were innocent). 
In each case, we asked participants to estimate the percentage likelihood of the defendant 
being guilty, and the percentage likelihood of the defendant being found guilty at trial. The order 
of these questions was counterbalanced. We then asked them what they would advise the 
defendant to do in the hypothetical, and asked them to give a short justification for their response 
We used these answers to examine the relationships between probability of conviction at trial, 
guilt and innocence, and plea advice, in a real task.  
Following completion of all tasks attorneys completed some short demographics 
questions asking about gender, political orientation, and years in legal practice.  
Results 
 One hundred and sixty-six participants answered our questions about experiences with 
the plea-bargaining system. Of these 166 participants, 163 (98.19%, 95% CI [94.82%, 99.38%]) 
stated that they had experience advising clients on whether to accept plea bargains, one stated 
that they did not have experience advising clients on whether to accept plea bargains (0.60%, 
95% CI [.01%, 3.33%]), and two said that they preferred not to answer (1.20%, 95% CI [.03%, 
4.28%]).  
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Interview Questions 
How often do innocent defendants plead guilty?  When asked whether they had ever 
been involved in a case where a client chose to plead guilty despite maintaining their innocence, 
148 (89.16%, 95% CI [83.52%, 93.03%]) of our participants said yes, 14 (8.43%, 95% CI 
[5.09%, 13.65%]) of our participants said no, and 4 (2.41%, 95% CI [.94%, 6.03%]) of our 
participants said that they preferred not to answer. Mean comparisons (using t-tests) revealed no 
significant differences in years of experience (p = .178) or political orientation (p = .353) 
between those who had been involved in such a case and those who hadn’t, and a chi-square 
analysis revealed no significant difference between male and female attorneys (p = .994).  
Seventy-four (44.58%, 95% CI [37.23%, 52.18%]) of our participants said that they had 
advised a client who they believed was innocent to plead guilty, 78 (46.99%, 95% CI [39.55% - 
54.56%]) said that they had not, and 14 (8.43%, 95% CI [5.09%, 13.65%]) preferred not to 
answer that question. Mean comparisons (using t-tests) revealed that participants who had 
advised a client they believed was innocent to plead guilty had significantly more years of 
experience on average than those who had not (Mhadadvised = 13.93 SD = 10.17 ; Mhadnot = 10.17 
SD = 12.08, p=.041), but there was no significant difference in political orientation, and a chi-
square analysis revealed no significant difference between male and female attorneys (p = .465).  
Thirty attorneys provided an estimate of the proportion of defendants who plead guilty 
that they believe to be innocent, or guilty of a lesser offense than the one they pled guilty to. 
Estimates varied widely from less than 5% to 70% (M = 23.82, SD = 19.59) (Figure 1). An 
examination of correlations between years of attorney experience and estimated proportion of 
defendants who plead guilty that they believe to be innocent or guilty of a lesser offense revealed 
that as attorney’s experience increased, the lower their estimates were likely to be (r = -.457, p 
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= .028). A one-way analysis of variance revealed no significant association between political 
orientation (r = .390, p = .054) and estimates and a t-test revealed no significant difference 
between estimates of male and female attorneys (p = .418).  
_____________________________ 
            Insert Figure 1 about here 
  
               __________________________________ 
 
 
Are there cases in the current system in which innocent defendants should plead 
guilty? We asked attorneys whether they believed there were cases in which innocent defendants 
should plead guilty. One hundred and fifty-two attorneys gave a yes or no response to this 
question. Of those attorneys, 119 (78.29%, 95% CI [71.08% - 84.10%]) said there were cases in 
which innocent defendants should plead guilty given the current system. Thirty-three (21.71%, 
95% CI [15.9%, 28.92%]) said that innocent defendants should not ever plead guilty. Mean 
comparisons (using t-tests) showed that the attorneys that said there were cases in which 
innocent defendants should plead guilty and those that said that there were not did not differ in 
mean years of experience (p = .938) or political orientation (p = .745). A chi squared analysis 
showed that the proportion of attorneys responding that there were cases in which innocent 
defendants should plead guilty did not significantly differ based on attorney gender (χ2 = .704, 
p=.402).  
Attorneys who said that innocent defendants should plead guilty were asked to elaborate 
on the circumstances in which they thought this was the case. We reviewed responses to identify 
general (and overlapping) themes that responses would fit into. We identified four broad themes 
– when possible outcomes at trial were very severe, where a cost-benefit analysis favored taking 
the plea (e.g. because of strong evidence against a defendant and a good plea offer), where 
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pleading guilty would benefit the client through faster and easier resolution of the case (e.g. 
getting them out of jail, or avoiding the difficulty and pressure of trial), and avoiding significant 
repercussions through a plea.  Two authors then independently classified each response into one 
or more of the themes. There was unanimous agreement on the classifications, indicating high 
reliability. Table 1 shows a summary of the number of attorneys who identified each theme, and 
some sample responses for each theme. Note that some attorneys identified more than one theme 
in their response.  
_____________________________ 
            Insert Table 1 about here 
  
               __________________________________ 
 
 Several attorneys gave examples of cases in which they had likely innocent clients who 
chose to plead guilty. For example – a case where a likely innocent client was charged with a 
felony where a loss of life was involved but could plead guilty to a misdemeanor and be released 
from jail, a case in which a likely innocent client was charged with sexual assaults (and 
threatened with a 40-year felony sentence) and could pled guilty to disorderly conduct and be 
sentenced to pay only court costs, and a case in which a likely innocent client was accused of 
murder and could plead guilty to being an accessory after the fact and be sentenced to time 
served (8 months in jail) and probation.  Many attorneys also noted that the ultimate decision as 
to whether to plead guilty (when innocent or otherwise) was with the client. Another recurring 
theme was mandatory sentences (laws in some states that require defendants convicted of certain 
crimes to serve predefined terms, see Subramanian, & Delaney, 2014). Mandatory sentences 
were mentioned by 15 attorneys as a reason that innocent defendants pled guilty, due to the harsh 
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outcomes mandated upon conviction at trial, and discrepancies between these outcomes and plea 
offers.  
The role of attorneys. Examination of responses showed that the number of attorneys 
who said that they had encouraged a client who wished to go to trial to take a plea deal was 
significantly higher than the number of attorneys who said that they had encouraged a client who 
wanted to take a plea deal to go to trial (χ2 = 29.37, p<.001). One hundred and fifty-three 
attorneys answered our question about whether they had ever encouraged a client who wished to 
take a plea deal to go to trial. Of these attorneys, 97 (63.40%, 95% CI [55.53%, 70.62%]) said 
that they had encouraged a client who wished to take a plea deal to go to trial, and 56 (36.60%, 
95% CI [29.38%, 44.47%]) said that they had not. Mean comparisons (using t-tests) showed that 
attorneys who said they had encouraged a client who wished to take a plea deal to go to trial had 
significantly greater average experience (M = 15.47, SD = 11.16) than those who said they had 
not (M = 10.64, SD = 7.71) (p = .007). The groups did not significantly differ in political 
orientation (p =.913). A Chi-Square analysis indicated that the proportion of male attorneys who 
had encouraged a client who wished to take a plea deal to go to trial was greater than the 
proportion of female attorneys (Male = 68.1%, Female = 52.2%, χ2 = 5.378, p=.020). 
When asked whether they had ever encouraged a client who wanted to go to trial to 
accept a plea deal, 154 of our attorneys gave a yes or no answer. Of these attorneys, 138 
(89.60%, 95% CI [83.79%, 93.50%]) said that they had encouraged a client who wanted to go to 
trial to accept a plea deal, and 16 (10.39%, 95% CI [6.50%, 16.21%]) said that they had not. An 
analysis using t-tests indicated that these groups did not differ significantly in years of 
experience (p = .469) or political orientation (p = .317). There was also no significant difference 
in the responses of male and female attorneys (Male = 86.8%, Female = 88.1%, χ2 = .306, 
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p=.580). These results suggest that attorneys are advising clients who want to go to trial to plead 
guilty more often than they are advising clients who want to plead guilty to go to trial. 
We also examined attorneys who said they had advised a client who they thought was 
innocent to plead guilty and attorneys who said they had never advised a client who they thought 
was innocent to plead guilty separately, to compare the proportion of each group who had 
encouraged a client who wanted to go to trial to plead guilty. The difference between the two 
groups was significant – a greater proportion of attorneys who had advised a client who they 
thought was innocent to plead guilty (94.1%, 95% CI [85.13%, 97.08%]) had encouraged a client 
who wanted to go to trial to plead guilty than attorneys who had never advised a client who they 
thought was innocent to plead guilty (71.4%, 95% CI [60.96%, 80.57%]) (χ2 = 5.679, p=.017). 
We examined the reasons that attorneys gave for encouraging (or not encouraging) a 
client who wanted to accept a plea deal to go to trial (Table 2) and the reasons that attorneys 
gave for encouraging (or not encouraging) a client who wanted to go to trial to accept a plea deal 
(Table 3) (note that not all attorneys gave a reason and some attorneys gave more than one 
reason). For each set of responses, we identified broad categories into which responses fell and 
categorized responses into these categories. Coding of each of the two reviewers matched almost 
exactly with only one attorney response being coded differently, indicating high reliability. 
 
_____________________________ 
            Insert Table 2 about here 
  
               __________________________________ 
_____________________________ 
            Insert Table 3 about here 
  
               __________________________________ 
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Experimental Task Assessing Attorney Advice 
Finally, we analyzed the results of our experimental task in which we gave attorneys case 
facts from two cases (Case 1 involving a school girl accused of marijuana possession, and Case 2 
involving an adult accused of sexual assault). One hundred and eighty-nine attorneys answered 
these questions. Overall, attorneys advised the defendant to plead guilty more in Case 1 
(Mcase1=.55, SD = .50, Mcase2= .37, SD = .49, p<.001 (Fishers Exact Test)).  Attorneys also 
thought that the defendant in Case 1 was more likely to be guilty (Mcase1=65.12, SD = 24.58, 
Range = 0% - 100%; Mcase2= 47.00, SD = 20.56, Range = 0% - 100%; t(170)=8.54,  p<.001), and 
that the defendant in Case 1 was more likely to be convicted at trial (Mcase1=77.34, SD=16.12, 
Range = 10% - 100%; Mcase2 = 62.68, SD =20.77, Range = 9% - 100%; t(170)=8.19, p<.001). 
Ninety-five attorneys were in our condition where a misdemeanor conviction would have its 
normal consequences in each case. Ninety-four attorneys were in our condition where a 
misdemeanor conviction would have an abnormally severe impact (by impacting immigration 
status in Case 1, or through causing the loss of a career as a teacher in Case 2).  
In both cases, we conducted a logistic regression using our misdemeanor impact 
condition, attorney estimates of the probability of conviction at trial, and attorney estimates of 
defendant guilt, to predict plea advice. We also controlled for gender which was not the same 
across our experimental manipulations (in our normal misdemeanor condition, 37% of 
participants were male, and in our severe misdemeanor condition, 48% of participants were 
male).1 The results for Case 1 (marijuana) and Case 2 (sexual assault) are displayed in Table 4.  
                                                
1 Initially we also included political orientation and years of experience in separate regressions 
with our other predictors, but these were not significant and did not differ significantly between 
our assigned groups and so this was removed for the purposes of our final analysis to minimize 
predictors in our regression due to sample size. 
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             _________________________ 
            Insert Table 4 about here 
  
               __________________________________ 
 
In both cases, the probability of conviction estimate and the probability of guilt estimate 
were significant predictors of plea advice, such that as estimations of the probability of 
conviction increased and as estimators of the probability of guilt increased, the chance of 
advising the client to plead guilty increased. In case 1, misdemeanor impact was also a 
significant predictor, such that when getting a misdemeanor would have a more severe 
consequence for the defendant (namely influencing immigration status) attorneys were more 
likely to advise the client to go to trial.  
Finally, we looked specifically at attorneys who had stated that there was a less than 50% 
chance that the defendant was guilty in each case, to specifically examine the decisions of 
attorneys who believed the defendant was probably innocent.  
In Case 1, 29 attorneys thought that there was a less than 50% chance that the defendant 
was guilty. Of these attorneys, 45% recommended that the defendant plead guilty. A logistic 
regression showed that in this group attorneys in the condition with a severe impact of a 
misdemeanor were less likely to recommend pleas (B=-2.873, SE = 1.085, Wald = 7.012, OR 
=17.70, p=.008), but there was no significant influence of likelihood of conviction at trial, or 
gender. We examined the reasons why these attorneys, who thought there was a less than 50% 
chance that the client was guilty, would recommend a guilty plea. Responses referred to the fact 
that she would be unlikely to win at trial (e.g. She seems unlikely to win at trial) and the more 
serious consequences of a felony conviction (e.g. The plea would mean that she would not lose 
her civil rights, would not have a felony conviction on her record…I would want to protect her in 
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case of future police contact. The risks of a felony conviction along with a lifetime of 
consequences associated with that conviction are too great to accept in this scenario when 
compared with the far less significant consequences of explaining a misdemeanor charge).  
In Case 2, 65 attorneys thought that there was a less than 50% chance that the defendant 
was guilty. Of these attorneys, 22% recommended that the defendant plead guilty. A logistic 
regression showed that in this group attorneys who thought there was a higher chance of 
conviction at trial were more likely to recommend pleading guilty (B=.091, SE = .026, Wald = 
11.92, OR =.913, p=.001), but there was no significant influence of our misdemeanor 
manipulation, or gender. We examined the reasons why these attorneys, who thought there was a 
less than 50% chance that the client was guilty, would recommend a guilty plea. Responses 
referred to the fact that the risk of trial would be high (e.g. The risk is too high for a trial, but I 
would not push the client to make this decision), that juries in child sexual abuse cases often 
believe the child (e.g. It will be his word against the client and juries are liable to believe the 
child), and that the likely penalty if convicted would be very serious (e.g. He would face decades 
in prisons and many other severe repercussions from a felony conviction of this nature. No one 
could risk the mandatory felony penalties on sex crimes when offered a misdemeanor).  
 
Discussion 
This study provides what is, to our knowledge, the first empirical study of attorney 
perspectives on plea bargaining, and attorney plea recommendations. Although our data is only 
from a relatively small sample of attorneys, it confirms concerns that have been raised in the 
legal literature and the psycho-legal literature regarding the extent to which innocent defendants 
are pleading guilty and the procedures in the current plea system that seem to encourage this 
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practice (see Blume & Helm, 2014; Dervan, 2012; Dervan & Edkins, 2013; Covey, 2013; 
Hessick & Saujani, 2002).  Results provide important insight into how often innocent defendants 
are (and should be) pleading guilty in the current system, attorney perceptions of their role in the 
plea system generally and this practice specifically, and the extent to which guilt and innocence 
might influence attorney advice.  This insight allows us to form conclusions about limitations in 
the current system and to better understand how attorney advice might be shaping plea practice. 
Innocent Defendants Do Plead Guilty But It Is Unclear How Often  
Scholars supporting plea bargaining have argued that innocent defendants would be 
unlikely to find plea offers attractive, going as far as to describe the problem of innocent 
defendants pleading guilty as “barely a perceptible theoretical ripple” when compared with other 
costs in the plea-bargaining system (Easterbrook, 1992; Schulhofer, 1992). However, 
accumulating research suggests that innocent defendants might be pleading guilty fairly 
frequently (for example Dervan & Edkins, 2013; Grisso et al., 2003; Helm & Reyna, 2017; Tor, 
Gazal-Ayal, & Garcia, 2010). Our results support this accumulating research. They indicate that 
almost all of our attorneys have experience dealing with clients who claim to be innocent but 
plead guilty (although we do not have an indication of how often). Importantly, when asked 
about the proportion of defendants who plead guilty but are really innocent or guilty only of a 
lesser charge, there was very little consensus among attorneys, with estimates ranging from less 
than 5% to over 50%, and many choosing not to give a response at all (although note that this 
question was only given to 46 of our attorneys). This is understandable since it is very difficult 
for an attorney to know whether a client is factually innocent or guilty. However, importantly, 27 
of the 30 attorneys who answered this question believed that of the defendants who plead guilty 
5% or more are factually innocent or guilty of a lesser charge. If true, this would make plea 
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bargaining a very important cause of wrongful conviction (although note that wrongful 
convictions resulting from plea are likely to be convictions for lesser sentences than those 
resulting from trial), and certainly more of a problem than a barely perceptible theoretical ripple.      
The Majority of Attorneys Agree There Are Situations In Which Innocent Defendants 
Should Plead Guilty And Have Advised Accordingly 
Our results indicate that the majority of attorneys do believe that there are situations in 
the current system in which innocent defendants should plead guilty, and have advised 
defendants who they believe to be innocent to plead guilty. Specifically, almost half of our 
attorneys indicated that they had advised clients who they believe to be innocent to plead guilty. 
Results also provided insight into when attorneys might provide this kind of advice, with the 
leading two reasons being when a costs benefits analysis promotes this, and when defendants are 
threatened with severe punishments at trial (even where there is not a high chance of conviction 
at trial).  
The costs benefits analysis scenario fits with arguments justifying the plea system on the 
basis that innocent defendants are able to, and should be able to, enjoy the benefits of pleading 
guilty if this is their risk preference (Bowers, 2008; Easterbrook, 1992). According to these 
arguments, persons at risk of unjust conviction may prefer a certain (but low) punishment in a 
plea bargain to the risk of conviction and higher punishment after trial (Easterbrook, 1992), and 
this can lead to less punishment for defendants who are truly innocent (Bowers, 2008).  These 
arguments are based on the idea that defendants will be able to rationally weigh the costs and 
benefits of a plea offer in a sensible way. However, importantly, our research suggests that from 
the perspective of attorneys there are other reasons that innocent defendants may find pleading 
guilty the most sensible option, given the current system. Defendants are threatened with such 
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harsh punishments at trial (something that is exacerbated by mandatory minimum sentences) and 
offered very lenient plea deals – for example a sentence of time served (8 months) and a 
misdemeanor conviction when threatened with a murder conviction if convicted at trial. This 
kind of discrepancy is likely to lead to innocent defendants pleading guilty even when there is 
only a very small probability of conviction at trial, and the gravity of the threatened punishment 
does not truly give defendants a fair choice in this situation.   This problem can be exacerbated 
by the practice of vertical “overcharging,” whereby prosecutors include different substantive 
offences in an initial charge with the intent to dismiss one or more of them (Ross, 1978).  
Attorneys Advise Clients Who Want To Go To Trial To Plead Guilty More Than They 
Advise Clients Who Want To Plead Guilty To Go To Trial 
 Our results suggest some disagreement among attorneys regarding their role in the plea- 
bargaining process, with some attorneys providing clients with advice on their decisions based 
on their knowledge and experience, and other attorneys feeling their job is only to provide 
information to clients who should then be left to make their own decisions.  
Our results suggest that attorneys are more likely to encourage a client who wants to go 
to trial to enter a plea bargain than to encourage a client who wants to plea bargain to go to trial 
(although note that this could be because more clients have a bias towards trial, rather than 
because attorneys have a bias towards pleas). Interestingly, this difference is driven largely by 
female attorneys, who are more reluctant than male attorneys to encourage a client who wants to 
plead guilty to go to trial.  Responses show that the difference may be due to a reluctance to be 
responsible for imposing a large risk on a client, especially when consequences of conviction at 
trial could be severe (even if chances of this outcome are low). Attorneys who had not ever 
encouraged a client who wanted to take a plea bargain also frequently said that they did not do so 
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because the decision was up to the client, although note that this consideration was important to 
far fewer attorneys when asked whether they had ever encouraged a client who wanted to go to 
trial to accept a plea bargain (8 attorneys, compared to 26).  
Importantly, the proportion of attorneys noting that they had encouraged a client who 
wanted to go to trial to plead guilty was greater among our attorneys who said they had 
encouraged a client they suspected to be innocent to plead guilty. This does suggest that 
attorneys may be leading to a greater number of innocent clients pleading guilty, although this is 
not necessarily a bad thing given the current system and the considerations discussed in this 
paper. 
Guilt and Innocence Do Influence Attorney Advice  
The results of our experimental task confirm that even in cases in which attorneys think a 
client is innocent, they may encourage them to plead guilty (45% of attorneys in our first case 
and 22% of attorneys in our second case who were less than 50% sure the defendant was guilty 
said they would advise them to plead guilty). Responses suggest that although some attorneys 
based this advice on a high chance of conviction at trial, attorneys were also influenced by a 
reluctance to expose clients to the risks of a severe outcome if convicted at trial. Importantly 
(especially for our Case 2 where there was no impact of our severe misdemeanor consequences 
condition) some attorneys were advising clients they thought were likely not guilty to plead 
guilty even where the plea would have severe consequences for them (in Case 2 this was loss of 
a career in teaching). However, overall results of this task did show that as attorney estimates of 
guilt increased, the tendency to recommend a guilty plea also increased, even when controlling 
for the probability of conviction at trial. This suggests that attorneys are more reluctant to 
encourage defendants who they believe are innocent to plead guilty.  
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Limitations and Future Directions 
 The findings of our study should be interpreted in light of some important limitations. 
First, several attorneys completing our hypothetical plea scenarios noted that not enough 
information had been provided for them to truly assess the cases. For example, they did not have 
access to witness statements, were not able to ask questions of the defendant, did not have 
evidence of the history of the defendant, and did not have expert opinions on the quality of case 
evidence (e.g. memory evidence in Case 2). This information would allow attorneys to better 
assess the evidence and their client’s chances at trial, and would thus likely influence plea 
advice.  In addition, we did not include preferences of defendants in our vignettes, and the 
vignettes were hypothetical and differed in important respects from real legal cases. Another 
limitation of this work is that it relied on self-report responses by a sub-set of attorneys. Our 
findings are therefore influenced by which attorneys chose to participate in the study, and what 
they chose to report to us.  
Our findings should also be considered alongside reports of defendants about their 
interactions with attorneys, which suggest that in some cases the interaction of clients and 
attorneys may be limited (Zottoli et al., 2016). The amount of time spent with an attorney is 
likely to influence plea decisions, and is not something that we examined in this study. An 
attorney who only spends a few minutes with a client prior to a plea hearing may leave a client 
feeling that they have no option but to plead guilty due to the rushed context in which the 
discussion takes place which may leave them with little confidence in the attorney. An attorney 
who spends longer with a defendant is likely to be able to more clearly convey the pros and cons 
of each decision and leave the client with a clear understanding that they can base their decision 
on. Results should be interpreted with these limitations in mind, and future research should 
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investigate the findings of this study further when considering real legal cases in which attorneys 
have advised clients. Future research should also gather more responses from each state, to 
enable comparisons between attorneys from states with different legal infrastructures (e.g. 
whether the state allows Alford pleas or not), and data on different types of cases to further 
compare whether plea recommendations differ depending on the type of case. 
Conclusions  
 In this paper, we examined attorney perspectives on the extent to which innocent 
defendants are (and should be) pleading guilty in the current system and on their role in this 
complex system. We also examined the ways in which defense attorneys consider guilt and 
innocence when advising on pleas, using a hypothetical case. Results show that in the current 
system innocent defendants are pleading guilty, and attorneys are advising them to do so in 
certain cases (despite being more reluctant to advise pleading guilty when a client is more likely 
to be innocent). Most importantly, results suggest that in the current system these attorneys are 
likely doing the right thing, and protecting their clients from severe consequences at trial.  
A theme that has come out of this study is that in the current system there are cases in 
which, from a practical perspective, innocent defendants should plead guilty, even when the 
chances they will be convicted at trial are not high. Importantly, a leading reason for this is that 
there is such a discrepancy between a plea offer and the outcome if convicted at trial that 
exercising the right to a trial becomes too risky even when the chances of conviction are low. 
The severe risks that can result from going to trial also appear to be making attorneys reluctant to 
advise clients to go to trial, since attorneys do not want to be responsible for imposing the risk of 
a severe conviction on a client when they could have received a much more lenient sentence in 
exchange for pleading guilty. This undercuts justifications that have been made for innocent 
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defendants pleading guilty, since it takes away the consent of the defendant and the ability of the 
attorney to prevent the conviction of innocent defendants. When confronted with the chance of a 
possible murder conviction vs. a misdemeanor, defendants and attorneys often do not truly have 
a choice even where the chances of conviction are low. Thus, attorney advice may be driving up 
the number of innocent defendants pleading guilty while also protecting innocent defendants 
from disastrous consequences at trial. So, perhaps 95% of innocent defendants are accepting 
pleas when they would have been found innocent at trial, while 5% of innocent defendants are 
avoiding disastrous consequences that would have occurred at jury trial. Put simply, attorney’s 
hands are tied. All they can do is to try to protect clients as best they can in the current system, 
rather than actually negotiating a just outcome.   
 These results provide further evidence of the need for reforms in the current system, and 
particularly highlight the need to reduce the discrepancies between sentences and charges given 
in exchange for pleading guilty and potential outcomes at trial. This could be done either through 
constraining the discounts offered by prosecutors in exchange for pleas, or by introducing plea-
based ceilings so that trial sentences could not exceed plea sentences by more than a modest 
amount (Covey, 2007). If it is really the case that someone who has committed a certain crime 
should get a certain sentence, this should be the case for all people who have committed that 
crime, not just for those who chose to exercise their right to a jury trial.  Reducing the 
discrepancy between outcomes if convicted at trial and outcomes when pleading guilty would 
allow attorneys to appropriately advise their clients absent the fear of their client receiving a 
disproportionately high punishment, thus improving their ability to effectively negotiate justice 
and protect innocent defendants. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Responses when asked whether there are cases in which innocent defendants should plead guilty. 
Theme Number of 
Attorneys 
Sample Responses 
Severe outcome 
at trial 
49 Many innocent people take deals when facing draconian mandatory penalties. 
Faced with decades of prison and offered a year or two, rational people don’t even 
gamble. 
 
Even if the risks of losing are extremely small, the consequences of losing can 
change a client’s life where the consequences of a plea will not. 
 
If the risks of conviction are great, even if the likelihood is low, it may make sense. 
 
The state has such incredible leverage and power in many cases, it can be in 
someone’s best interest to accept a plea to eliminate their risk of catastrophic 
consequences. 
 
Cost-benefit 
analysis / 
Chance of 
conviction and 
sentences 
involved 
76 Where it is unlikely they will be successful at trial AND the plea deal is for a 
substantially less crime or minor sentence 
 
When the evidence is overwhelming and the stakes are very high, like mandatory 
minimum sentences to be avoided. 
 
Yes – it is a pure costs benefit analysis especially where there are immigration or 
job related consequences that can be avoided by a plea. 
 
When the likelihood of conviction and a substantially worse outcome outweighs the 
likelihood of acquittal or a substantially better outcome. 
 
Faster and easier 
resolution 
17 I have been involved in cases where it would have taken my clients longer than the 
sentence stimulated in the plea offer to go through trial and litigate the case.  
 
Clients in pretrial custody with a preexisting criminal record can benefit from 
pleading guilty to a petty charge for the sole reason that they can get out of custody 
and resume their lives. 
 
Unfortunately, clients may have to plead guilty to save money due to incarceration 
while waiting for trial.  
 
When a person has been held in jail for several weeks without the means to bond out 
and the offense is relatively minor, clients often lose their motivation to fight. 
 
A plea offer than 
avoids any 
significant 
repercussions 
15 Yes, an innocent client might plead guilty if the consequences would not hamper 
future activity such as job qualifications, or movement.  
 
A plea that avoids significant repercussions and eliminates the risk of these things is 
usually worth it. 
 
An obvious case is where the conviction will be of no practical consequence. 
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Table 2: Reasons given by attorneys for encouraging a client to go to trial rather than plead guilty, and for not 
encouraging a client to go to trial rather than plead guilty.  
 Proportion of attorneys 
in each category giving 
this reason 
95% Confidence Interval 
Reason for encouraging a client to go to trial (n=97)  
Client doesn’t appreciate the long-term 
consequences of a plea 
.093 .050 - .167 
The client is irrational as they are scared .062 .029 - .129 
The client underestimates their chance of success 
and / or there is a good chance of success at trial 
.515 .417 - .613 
The plea offer is bad and / or the client has little to 
lose by going to trial 
.340 .254 - .439 
Believe that the client is innocent .124 .072 - .204 
Reasons for not encouraging a client to go to trial (n=56)  
The unpredictability of jury trial / possibility of jury 
bias / don’t want to impose risk on the client 
.107 .050 - .215 
It is the client’s choice what to do .589 .459 - .708 
It is unethical to do so .036 .010 - .121 
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Table 3: Reasons given by attorneys for encouraging a client to plead guilty rather than go to trial, and for not 
encouraging a client to plead guilty rather than go to trial.  
 Proportion of attorneys 
in each category giving 
this reason 
95% Confidence Interval 
Reason for encouraging a client to plead guilty (n=138)   
Chances of success at trial are very small .667 .585 - .740 
Potential consequences of trial / risk at trial too 
great 
.674 592 - .747 
The unpredictability of trial / minimizing 
uncertainty 
.051 .025 - .101 
The client has an unrealistic view of the facts and / 
or trial 
.058 .030 - .110 
The costs of trial .065 .035 - .119 
Reasons for not encouraging a client to plead guilty (n=16)  
It is the client’s choice what to do .563 .332 - .769 
It is unethical to do so .063 .011 - .283 
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Table 4: Logistic regression results using impact of misdemeanor, probability of conviction at trial estimate, 
probability of guilt estimate, and gender, to predict plea advice (0=Go to trial, 1=Plead guilty). 
 
 B SE  Wald OR 
Case 1 (Marijuana)     
         Misdemeanor Impact (0,1) -1.90 .393 23.30 6.65* 
         Prob. of conviction estimate .046 .013 11.68 .955* 
         Prob. of guilt estimate .016 .008 3.84 .985* 
         Gender (0,1) -.054 .387 .020 .947 
     
Case 2 (Sexual Assault)     
         Misdemeanor Impact (0,1) -.419 .430 .950 1.52 
         Prob. of conviction estimate .081 .015 31.01 .922* 
         Prob. of guilt estimate .025 .013 3.84 .975* 
         Gender (0,1) .250 .422 .334 .779 
*p≤.05 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Attorney estimates of the proportion of people who plead guilty who are actually innocent, or guilty of a 
letter offense than they plead guilty to. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Case 1 Introduction  
 
Imagine that you are representing a client, Sara. Sara is a senior in college who makes below 
average grades and has spotty attendance, but she is likely to graduate.  
 
On a recent Saturday evening, a police officer noticed her and a group of people hanging around 
a school playground. The officer suspected that he smelled marijuana and called for backup. The 
police quickly surrounded the playground and moved in. Sara tried to run off but was cornered in 
an alleyway. She was found with a small bag (3 grams or about one-tenth of an ounce) of 
methamphetamine powder and a list of known drug dealers.  
 
The other 19 people at the scene fled and were not apprehended by police.   
 
Sara claims that she only had the methamphetamine and list because it was handed to her by 
someone else as they ran away.  
 
The prosecution have offered Sara a plea deal whereby she can plead guilty to possession of 
methamphetamine (a misdemeanor in the jurisdiction), and other charges against her (including 
felony trafficking charges) will be dropped.  
 
[Sara is a legal immigrant in the process of applying for US citizenship. If she receives any 
criminal conviction, it is unlikely that her citizenship application will be successful] 
 
 
 
Case 1 Follow-Up Questions 
 
What do you think is the likelihood of Sara being found guilty of a criminal offense at trial? 
 
What do you think is the likelihood that Sara is guilty? 
 
What would you advise Sara to do in this situation? 
 
Please briefly explain why you would give this advice. 
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Case 2 Introduction 
 
Imagine that you are representing an adult client, James. James is accused of sexually assaulting 
a 10-year-old child. This is based on claims made by the child that while James was babysitting 
her and she was in the shower, James came into the bathroom and told her to put his penis in her 
mouth. The child's mother claims that the child told her what had happened as soon as she 
arrived home, and was very distressed by the incident.  
 
James was babysitting her on the night in question but strongly denies any wrongdoing. He notes 
that he did enter the bathroom while the child was in the shower as she cried out needing 
assistance, but that he did not tell her to put his penis in her mouth or engage in any other 
sexually suggestive behavior.  
 
The prosecution have offered James a plea deal whereby he can plead guilty to misdemeanor 
sexual assault against a child, and the felony sexual assault against a child charge will be 
dropped.   
 
[James is a teacher and if he receives either of these convictions he will lose his current job and 
will never be able to work as a teacher again.] 
 
 
 
Case 2 Follow-Up Questions 
 
What do you think is the likelihood of James being found guilty of a criminal offense at trial? 
 
What do you think is the likelihood that James is guilty? 
 
What would you advise James to do in this situation? 
 
Please briefly explain why you would give this advice. 
 
 
 
